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Abstract This paper introduces a new notion of a “procedural” value for cooperative
TU games. A procedural value is determined by an underlying procedure of sharing
marginal contributions to coalitions formed by players joining in random order. We
consider procedures under which players can only share their marginal contributions
with their predecessors in the ordering, and study the set of all resulting values. The
most prominent procedural value is, of course, the Shapley value obtaining under
the simplest procedure of every player just retaining his entire marginal contribution.
But different sharing rules lead to other interesting values, including the “egalitarian
solution” and the Nowak and Radzik “solidarity value”. All procedural values are effi-
cient, symmetric and linear. Moreover, it is shown that these properties together with
two very natural monotonicity postulates characterize the class of procedural values.
Some possible modifications and generalizations are also discussed. In particular, it is
shown that dropping one of monotonicity axioms is equivalent to allowing for sharing
marginal contributions with both predecessors and successors in the ordering.
Keywords Cooperative game · Procedure · Value · Efficiency · Weak monotonicity ·
Coalitional monotonicity · Extended procedure.
1 Introduction
A significant amount of research has been conducted on classes of efficient values for
cooperative transferable utility games which obtain by various methods of distributing
the coalition dividends (Harsányi 1959) among players. These values can be viewed as
variations on the Shapley value obtained by equal division of every coalition’s dividend
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among its members. The notions of selector values (Derks et al. 2000), weighted
Shapley values (Kalai and Samet 1987) or random order values (Weber 1988) are now
well-established in the cooperative game theory.
In this paper I define and study another class of values for cooperative TU games.
Though it might well be claimed that these values also deserve the name of “random
order values”, I use the term “procedural values” instead. These values are also close
relatives of the Shapley value. The generalization, as well as the difference from the
aforementioned classes, lies in the fact that, while preserving the assumption of equal
probabilities of all possible orders in which the grand coalition is formed, I admit
the possibility of redistribution—but of marginal contributions of players instead of
dividends of coalitions. The method of redistribution will be called procedure. Every
procedure is determined by a family of real coefficients and, on the other hand, it
determines a value on the space of TU games. A reasonable interpretation is that
a player who wishes to join a coalition that has already formed is obliged to pay
an “entrance fee” to the players who already are in the coalition, and that this fee
constitutes a specified fraction of the newcoming player’s marginal contribution.
This section introduces the notions used in the paper. In Sect. 2 I present two
equivalent definitions of a procedure and a couple of simple examples, together with
the values resulting from the presented procedures. Section 3 is devoted to properties
of procedural values; it also contains the main theorem on their axiomatization. The
final section reviews some variations and generalizations.
Most of the notions and the notation used are standard. We shall be dealing with
n-person cooperative games, n being a fixed but arbitrary positive integer; usu-
ally the case n ≥ 3 is of interest. A cooperative game (transferable utility game)
is a pair (N , v), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players and v is the
characteristic function—any real function defined on the set of all coalitions, i.e. all
subsets of N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. Its values are called worths of coalitions. Since
the set of players will usually be fixed in this paper, I shall identify every cooperative
game with its characteristic function. The set of all n-person cooperative games will
be denoted by Gn ; this set forms a (2n − 1)-dimensional vector space.
The players will be denoted with small letters (i, j, k, . . .) , and the coalitions with
capitals (S, T,U, . . .). For a coalition denoted by a capital letter, the corresponding
lowercase letter will denote the cardinality of the coalition, e.g. t = #T . For brevity,
I shall usually omit braces when enumerating players in a coalition, thus obtaining for
instance i jk instead of {i, j, k} and T ∪ j instead of T ∪ { j} .
In a game (N , v), two players i, j ∈ N are interchangeable if, for every coalition
T ⊆ N \ {i, j}, v(T ∪ i) = v(T ∪ j), and player k ∈ N is a null player if, for every
coalition T ⊂ N , v(T ∪ k) = v(T ).
 is the set of all permutations of the set N . For any player j ∈ N and any
permutation π ∈ , let us denote:
Hπ, j = π−1({1, 2, . . . , π( j)}),
Nπ, j = π−1({π( j), π( j) + 1, . . . , n})
—the sets, respectively, of all predecessors of j and all successors of j in the ordering
π (in both cases including player j).
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For any real number z, z+ and z− will denote its positive and negative part:
z+ = max(z, 0) and z− = min(z, 0).
A value is any function ψ assigning to every game (N , v) ∈ Gn a vector ψ(v) =
(ψ1(v), ψ2(v), . . . , ψn(v)); ψ(v) is the value of the game (N , v), and its components
are individual values of the players. If
∑n
i=1 ψi (v) = v(N ) for every game (N , v) ∈ Gn
, then the value ψ is efficient. Efficient values are rules of dividing among all players
the quantity v(N ), interpreted as the “gain” that all players together can achieve if
they all agree to cooperate.
Many (though not all) commonly accepted values depend somehow on the marginal
contributions of players to coalitions. The marginal contribution of player j to coalition
T (containing j) is the difference v(T ) − v(T \ j). In particular, for a given ordering
π of N we shall denote by m j,π (v) the marginal contribution of j to the set of his
predecessors in the ordering π :
m j,π (v) = v(Hπ, j ) − v(Hπ, j \ j).
The historally first and undoubtedly most prominent value for cooperative games, the
Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is defined as the vector of expected marginal contribu-
tions of players under the probability measure given by uniform distribution on the
set :
φi (v) = E mi,π (v) =
∑
π∈
v(Hπ,i ) − v(Hπ,i \ i)
n! .
Various generalizations of the Shapley value are obtained when other probabil-
ity distributions on the set of permutations are allowed; this leads to the class of
random order values (see Weber 1988). The generalization in this paper goes in dif-
ferent direction. I follow Shapley in assuming that all permutations of players are
equally probable, but, unlike Shapley and Weber, I do not require players to retain
their marginal contributions for themselves. Instead, I assume some specific ways of
redistribution of marginal contributions of successive players entering the coalitions
between themselves and the players already present in the coalition.
2 Basic notions and examples. Equivalent representations
In this section the notions of procedure and procedural value will be introduced and
demonstrated at simple examples.
The scenario of obtaining and computing the procedural value consists of the fol-
lowing steps:
1. The players arrive in a random order π ; all orders (permutations of the set N ) are
equally probable.
2. Every arriving player, k, brings his marginal contribution, mk,π (v), to the coalition
of his predecessors.




4. In this way, for every permutation π the whole quantity v(N ) is distributed among
all players.
5. The procedural value of a player is the expected value (over all orders of arrival)
of his part of v(N ).
In this paper I confine my attention to simplest possible procedures, under which
the distribution of marginal contributions depends neither on players’ names nor on
their worths in the game. These procedures, thus, divide every marginal contribution
in proportions determined solely by the order in which the players form coalitions.
Moreover, every marginal contribution is retained within the coalition of the contrib-
utor and his predecessors—nothing is left for players who arrive later (some possible
variations on relaxing these requirements will be briefly discussed in the last section).
Definition 1a A procedure s on Gn is a family of nonnegative coefficients
((sk, j )kj=1)
n
k=1 such that (∀k)
∑k
j=1 sk, j = 1.
The coefficient sk, j describes the share of player who is at place j in the order [that
is, player π−1( j)] in the marginal contribution of player π−1(k). Obviously, since the
player π−1(1) has no predecessors, s1,1 = 1.
Definition 1b The procedural valueψ s determined by the procedure s onGn is defined
by the formula
ψ si (v) = Eπ
∑
j∈Nπ,i





sπ( j),π(i)m j,π (v)
n! . (1)
A few examples of procedures with very natural interpretation are presented below.
Procedure 1 ∀k (sk,k = 1 and ∀ j < k , sk, j = 0), that is, every player retains his
entire marginal contribution to every coalition for himself. This procedure of course
leads to the Shapley value: ψ si (v) = φi (v).
Procedure 2a Every player gives his entire marginal contribution to his immediate
predecessor:
s1,1 = 1; ∀k > 1 , sk,k−1 = 1 .
Procedure 2b Under every ordering of players, all players pass their marginal con-
tributions to the first player in the ordering:
∀k ≥ 1 , sk,1 = 1 .
Procedure 2c Every marginal contribution to the formed coalition is divided in equal
parts among all players in the coalition, excluding the newcomer (= contributor):
s1,1 = 1; (∀k > 1 ∀ j < k) sk, j = 1k − 1 .
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Procedure 3 All marginal contributions are divided in equal parts between the con-
tributing player and his immediate predecessor:
s1,1 = 1; ∀k > 1 , sk,k = sk,k−1 = 12 .
Procedure 4 Every marginal contribution is divided in equal parts among all players
in the coalition that has just formed, including the contributor:
(∀ k ≥ 1 ∀ j ≤ k) sk, j = 1k .
The example below demonstrates an application of procedures 2a, 2c and 4 to a
three-person game and the resulting values of the game.
Example 1 In the three-person game with the following characteristing function v:
v(1) = 1 , v(2) = 2 , v(3) = 3 ,
v(12) = 5 , v(13) = 7 , v(23) = 8 ,
v(123) = 12 ,
in the ordering given by π(i) ≡ i (players arriving in the order of their numbering)
procedure 2a divides v(N ) = 12 in the following way: 5 to player 1 , 7 to player 2 and 0
to player 3. Procedure 2c under the same ordering leads to division
(
1 + 4 + 72 , 72 , 0
)
,
and procedure 4—to division
(
1 + 42 + 73 , 42 + 73 , 73
)
.
Averaging over all six orderings, procedures 2a and 2c yield the same division
(4, 4, 4), i.e., the quantity v(N ) is shared in equal parts among all players. It is also
quite easy to check that the equal division will result from applying procedure 2b
in any game. Thus, all three procedures determine the same procedural value—the








. This is a particular
instance of theorem 1 below.
It follows that procedure 3 leads to the division being the arithmetic mean of the
equal distribution and the Shapley value. On the other hand, the division resulting








. More generally, the





(t − 1)!(n − t)!
n! A
0(T ) ,
where A0(T ) is the average marginal contribution to coalition T :
A0(T ) =
∑
k∈T (v(T ) − v(T \ k))
t
.
We have thus obtained as a by-product a new simple and plausible probabilistic inter-
pretation of the solidarity value: a player’s value is his expected gain when every
marginal contribution is shared in equal parts among all players in the coalition.
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Theorem 1 Equivalent representations: If s = ((sk, j )kj=1)nk=1 and t = ((tk, j )kj=1)nk=1
are two procedures such that, for all k, sk,k = tk,k , then ψ s = ψ t .





n! sπ( j),π(i) m j,π (v) .
The quantity q j,i is the expected value of player i’s share in player j’s marginal
contribution when procedure s is applied to game v. By (1),
ψ si (v) =
n∑
j=1




and so to prove the theorem it suffices to show that the quantities q j,i depend only on
those coefficients sk,l for which l = k. For i = j this is obvious. For i = j let us
partition the sum in the definition of q j,i into sums of terms over all possible coalitions





π : Hπ, j =T
1
n! st,π(i) m j,π (v)








π : Hπ, j=T,π(i)=k
1




(v(T ) − v(T \ j))
t−1∑
k=1





(t − 2)!(n − t)!
n! (v(T ) − v(T \ j))(1 − st,t ) .
Thus, we have shown that q j,i —and therefore also ψ si (v)—do not depend on sk,l ,
l < k. unionsq
It is of some interest to observe that for a fixed coalition T the term under the last
sum does not depend on i : the expected shares of all players from the set T \ j in the
marginal contribution of player j to T are the same. It follows from the fact that equal
probabilities of all orderings imply that every player in T \ j has the same probability
(both conditional and unconditional) of being assigned to any of places 1, 2, ... , t −1,
and thus of obtaining any of the shares in player j’s marginal contribution.
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Theorem 1 means that the value determined by procedure s on Gn depends only on
the family of coefficients (sk,k)nk=1 , that is, on the shares of players in their own mar-
ginal contributions to coalitions. In other words, changing the coefficients (sk, j ) j<k
leads just to equivalent representations of the same procedural value. Therefore, in
what follows we shall use the abbreviated notation s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) for any pro-
cedure ((sk, j )kj=1)
n
k=1 on Gn , with s j, j = s j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Moreover, formula (1) for procedural values can be re-stated in a simpler form









(1 − sπ( j))m j,π (v)













(1 − sπ( j))m j,π (v)
n! . (3)
Equation (2) is obtained by distributing each of the quantities (1 − sπ( j))m j,π equally
among all players in the set Hπ, j \ j , and Eq. (3) by transferring all these quantities
to the “first” player, π−1(1). Both these equations are often useful for computing
particular procedural values.
A result converse to theorem 1 is also true: a procedural value ψ s on Gn uniquely
determines the coefficients (s1, s2, . . . , sn) of its underlying procedure.
Proposition 1 If s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) are two different proce-
dures on Gn, then ψ s = ψ t .
Proof Denote by k the smallest integer for which sk = tk (by definition of procedure,
k ≥ 2) and consider the simple game w defined by
w(U ) =
{
0 if u < k − 1 or (u = k − 1 and 1 ∈ U ) ,
1 if u ≥ k or (u = k − 1 and 1 ∈ U ) .
In this game player 1 is a null player and all other players are interchangeable, their
marginal contributions m j,π (w) ( j > 1) given by
m j,π (w) =
{
1 if ((π( j) = k − 1 < π(1)) or (π(1) < π( j) = k))
0 otherwise ,









Corollary 1 There is a one-to-one correspondence ψ s ↔ s between procedural
values on Gn and n-vectors s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) satisfying s1 = 1 , s2, . . . , sn ∈ [0, 1],
with the procedural value ψ s defined by formula (2) or (3).
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Remark 1 Linearity of values with respect to procedures: If t = (1, t2, . . . , tn) and
u = (1, u2, . . . , un) are two procedures, then for every λ ∈ [0, 1]
s = λt + (1 − λ)u
is a procedure, and the corresponding value ψ s is given by
ψ s = λψ t + (1 − λ)ψu .
This implies that the set P(Gn) of all procedural values on Gn is convex, with extreme
points being procedures with s2, . . . , sn ∈ {0, 1}. Since the Shapley value φ and the
egalitarian value e are its extreme points, the set of all egalitarian Shapley values,
defined by Joosten (1996) as convex combinations of φ and e and studied in detail
by van den Brink et al. (2011) is a diagonal of P(Gn). Also, as the solidarity value
σ is procedural and all coefficients of its procedure belong to ]0, 1[, it is an interior
point of P(Gn). Therefore, also all convex combinations of the Shapley value and the
solidarity value, studied by Nowak and Radzik (1996), are procedural and, except for
φ, belong to the interior of P(Gn) (but not to egalitarian Shapley values).
3 Procedural values: properties and axiomatizations
The following observation follows directly from the definition of procedural values:
Proposition 2 For every procedure s the value ψ s has the following properties:
– efficiency,
– linearity: ψ s(v+w) = ψ s(v)+ψ s(w) and ψ s(c ·w) = cψ s(w) for every games
v,w ∈ Gn and every constant c ∈ R,
– equal treatment property: if players i and j are interchangeable in the game v,
then ψ si (v) = ψ sj (v).
Actually, all procedural values have a property of symmetry (“anonymity”): for every
permutation π of the set N and every game v ∈ Gn and for the game π∗v defined by
π∗v(S) = v(π(S)) ∀S ⊂ N , the equality ψ si (π∗v) = ψ sπ(i)(v) holds for each i ∈ N .
In general, symmetry is stronger than equal treatment property; however, for linear
and efficient values the two are equivalent (Malawski 2007, theorem 2).
Remark 2 It follows immediately from proposition 2 and Shapley’s (Shapley 1953)
axiomatization of his value that the Shapley value is the unique procedural value with
the null player property, i.e. satisfying ψi (v) = 0 whenever i is a null player in v.
Proposition 2, although trivial, is of some use because it enables us to apply some
established properties of linear, symmetric and efficient values in an attempt to find
an axiomatic characterization of the class of all procedural values. In particular, the
following lemma will be very useful:
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Lemma 1 (Ruiz et al. 1998) Every linear and efficient value ψ having the equal








T⊂N , T i
ptv(T )
n − t
for every v and i , where p1, . . . , pn ∈ R , pn = 1.
Thus, the value of each player is a weighted sum of worths of all coalitions
with weights depending only on cardinalities of coalitions.1 We shall call p1, . . . pn
RVZ coefficients of the value ψ.
It can be expected that some kind of monotonicity of values might serve as an axiom
characterizing the procedural values together with the already established properties.
Let us recall the main monotonicity notions2 of values of TU games.
Definition 2 The value ψ on Gn is
– monotonic (Young 1985) if for every pair of games v,w ∈ Gn such that for
every coalition T we have v(T ∪ i) − v(T ) ≥ w(T ∪ i) − w(T ), the inequality
ψi (v) ≥ ψi (w) holds;
– weakly monotonic (Weber 1988) if in every monotone game v (i.e., satisfying
S ⊃ T ⇒ v(S) ≥ v(T )) the individual values of all players are nonnegative;
– coalitionally monotonic if for every coalition T and every two games v,w such
that (v(T ) > w(T ) and v(S) = w(S) for every S = T ) we have ψi (v) ≥ ψi (w)
for each i ∈ T ;
– locally monotonic if the inequality v(S ∪ i) ≥ v(S ∪ j) for all coalitions S
containing neither player i nor j implies that ψi (v) ≥ ψ j (v).
A well-known theorem by Young (1985) states that the Shapley value is the only
efficient and monotonic value with equal treatment property3, and it is clear that φ
is the unique monotonic procedural value. On the other hand, it is easy to prove
that all procedural values are weakly monotonic (just observe that players’ values
are nonnegative linear combinations of marginal contributions, which themselves are
necessarily nonnegative in a monotone game) and it will be shown below that they
are also coalitionally and locally monotonic. Moreover, the main theorem states that
weak monotonicity together with coalitional monotonicity do indeed characterize the
class of procedural values.
For the proof of this characterization, a number of lemmata will be needed. First,
we relate coefficients of a procedure to the RVZ coefficients of its procedural value
1 Some similar interesting forms of the same class of values have been recently presented by Radzik and
Driessen (2011) and Chameni Nembua (2012).
2 There are some ambiguities in the literature concerning the terminology of monotonicity notions—for
instance, Weber (1988) and Young (1985) use the term “monotonicity” to denote two different properties. In
what follows I use ”weak monotonicity” for monotonicity in the sense of Weber (even though some authors
use it for various other properties, see e.g. van den Brink et al. (2011)) in order to distinguish between
this property and more fundamental Young’s monotonicity. Coalitional monotonicity appears under the
same name in Young (1985) and Ruiz et al. (1998); local monotonicity is a well-known generalization of a
property of power indices, also known as desirability.
3 In fact, Young assumes symmetry, but it is clear from his proof that equal treatment is sufficient.
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(which exist by proposition 2). Further, we specify upper and lower bounds for the
RVZ coefficients when the value is weakly and / or coalitionally monotonic.
Lemma 2 For the value ψ s ∈ P(Gn) determined by a procedure s = (s1, s2, . . . sn),
the coefficients p1, . . . , pn are
pn = 1, pt = st+1(
n
t
) for t < n.
Proof By the definition of procedure, a procedural value of a player is always a
linear combination of worths of coalitions in the game, and we only need to find the
coefficients of this combination. To this end, let us apply formula (3) for computing
ψ si (v). In this formula, the worth v(N ) of the grand coalition appears
(1) for all ((n − 1)!) orderings in which π(i) = n, with coefficient sn
n!, and





= (n − 1)! sn
n! + (n − 1)!
1 − sn
n! , and so pn = 1.
The worth v(T ) of any other coalition containing player i appears
(1) in all ((t − 1)!(n − t)!) orderings in which π(i) = t and π(T ) = {1, 2, . . . , t},
with coefficient st
n!, and(2) in all ((t −1)!(n − t)!) permutations in which π(i) = 1 and π(T ) = {1, 2, . . . , t},
with coefficient 1−st




= (t − 1)!(n − t)! st+1






Finally, the worth v(U ) of any coalition not including player i appears with coeffi-
cient −su+1
n! for all (u!(n − u − 1)!) permutations in which π(i) = u + 1 and π(U ) =
{1, 2, . . . , u}, so −pu
n − u = −u!(n − u − 1)!
su+1






Corollary 2 Every efficient linear value with equal treatment property on Gn with
coefficients p1, . . . pn satisfying
pn = 1, 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1(
n
t
) for t = 1, 2, . . . n − 1 (4)
is procedural, and the coefficients of its procedure are





for k = 2, 3, . . . n . (5)
Remark 3 Out-of-range coefficients:
It should be noted that in the proofs of theorem 1, propositions 1 and 2 and lemma 2 non-
negativity of coefficients sk, j is not used, i.e., it is only required that
∑k
j=1 sk, j = 1 for
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each k. Thus, if definition 1a is modified by removing the assumption of sk, j ∈ [0, 1],
all these results will still hold for such “generalized procedures” and “generalized
procedural values”. A counterpart to corollary 2 will then be true with inequality
constraints in (4) dropped and “procedural” replaced by “generalized procedural”,
and it will imply the following theorem:
A value on Gn satisfies efficiency, linearity and equal treatment property if and only if
it is “generalized procedural”. Moreover, the coefficients of its generalized procedure
are given by formula (5).
Lemma 3 A linear efficient value having the equal treatment property is coalitionally
monotonic if and only if, for every t < n , pt ≥ 0 .
Proof Straightforward from the definition of coalitional monotonicity. unionsq
Lemma 4 Let c ∈ R and let t < n be a positive integer. If (N , v) is a game such that
v(T ) = c for every t-person coalition T, then for every player i
∑





S : S i , s=t
v(S)
n − s = 0.
Proof Obvious: there are (n−1t−1
)





t-person coalitions to which i does not belong. unionsq
Lemma 5 If a linear efficient value on Gn with the equal treatment property is weakly













ps ≥ −1 .
Proof Both inequalities are proved by computing the value of player 1 in an appropriate
monotone simple game and using the fact that it must be non-negative because of
weak monotonicity of the value. For any fixed but arbitrary t = 1, 2, . . . n − 1 and




0 if s < t or (s = t and 1 ∈ S) ,
1 if s > t or (s = t and 1 ∈ S),
y(S) =
{
0 if s < u or (u ≤ s ≤ t and 1 ∈ S) ,
1 if s > t or (u ≤ s ≤ t and 1 ∈ S) .













and similarly for ψ1(y). Further, since for every coalition S with more than t players
w(S) = y(S) = 1, both games satisfy the assumption of lemma 4 for every s such










S : s≤t , S 1
psw(S)










S : u≤s≤t , S 1
ps y(S)
n − s .















































Since w and y are monotone games, both expressions must be non-negative if ψ is a
weakly monotonic value. The inequality ψ1(w) ≥ 0 gives the upper bound for pt in
(a), and ψ1(y) ≥ 0 is equivalent to (b). unionsq
Theorem 2 A value on Gn is procedural if and only if it satisfies efficiency, linearity,
equal treatment property, weak monotonicity and coalitional monotonicity.
Proof It has been noticed earlier that all procedural values are efficient, linear, symmet-
ric and weakly monotonic, and it follows immediately from the first three properties
and lemmata 2 and 3 that they are also coalitionally monotonic. To prove the con-
verse, observe that the RVZ coefficients for any value satisfying the assumptions of
the theorem must
– exist, because of efficiency, linearity and equal treatment property,
– be nonnegative, because of coalitional monotonicity,
– satisfy pn = 1 by lemma 1, and





for t < n because of weak monotonicity [lemma 5 (a)],
and so they are exactly such as in corollary 2 and determine the coefficients of a
procedure by formula (5). unionsq
All procedural values are also locally monotonic, and in fact local monotonicity
can be used instead of coalitional monotonicity in the axiomatization of the class of
procedural values. This follows immediately from the following
Lemma 6 (a) Every coalitionally monotonic value with equal treatment property is
locally monotonic.
(b) Every linear, efficient and locally monotonic value is coalitionally monotonic and
has equal treatment property.
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Proof (a) We need to show that a player who is ”at least as strong” as another player
has at least the same value. To this end, consider two players i and j such that
v(S ∪ i) ≥ v(S ∪ j) for every coalition S to which neither i nor j belongs, and
the game v j→i defined as follows:




v(T ) when j ∈ T,
v(T ∪ i \ j) when i ∈ T , j ∈ T ,
v(T \ j) + v(T ) − v(T \ i) when i, j ∈ T .
In this new game player i’s marginal contributions are the same as in v but player j’s
marginal contributions are changed so that for every S such that i, j ∈ S we have
v j→i (S ∪ j) − v j→i (S) = v j→i (S ∪ i) − v j→i (S) .
This is, i and j are interchangeable in this game, and so if the value ψ has the equal
treatment property, then ψi (v j→i ) = ψ j (v j→i ).
Moreover, notice that for every coalition T containing player j we have v j→i (T ) ≥
v(T ) (by the definition of v j→i and the fact that v(S ∪ i) ≥ v(S ∪ j) for evry S ,
i, j ∈ S).
Further, the original game v obtains from v j→i by sucessive replacements of worths
of all coalitions T containing player j, v j→i (T ), by their initial worths, v(T ). Since for
these coalitions v j→i (T ) ≥ v(T ), every such replacement (worths of all other coali-
tions remaining unchanged) cannot increase the value of player j for a coalitionally
monotonic value ψ, and so ψ j (v) ≤ ψ j (v j→i ). Therefore,
ψ j (v) ≤ ψ j (v j→i ) = ψi (v j→i ) = ψi (v) .
(b) Equal treatment property follows trivially from local monotonicity. To prove
coalitional monotonicity, take a value ψ satisfying the assumptions and two games
v,w differing only on one coalition T, and assume without loss of generality that




1 for S = T,
0 for S = T .
In this game all marginal contributions of any player i ∈ T are nonnegative and all
marginal contributions of any player j ∈ T are nonpositive, so by local monotonicity
ψi (χT ) ≥ ψ j (χT ). Together with equal treatment and efficiency, this implies that
ψi (χT ) ≥ 0 and ψ j (χT ) ≤ 0. Therefore, since μ > 0,
ψi (v) = ψi (w) + μ · ψi (χT ) ≥ ψi (w)
which gives the coalitional monotonicity. unionsq
123
318 M. Malawski
An immediate corollary of theorem 2 and lemma 6 is another characterization
of procedural values using local monotonicity (and disposing of symmetry-type
assumption):
Theorem 3 A value on Gn is procedural if and only if it satisfies efficiency, linearity,
weak monotonicity and local monotonicity.
I conclude this section with a number of examples demonstrating that the conditions
for procedural values in theorems 2 and 3 are independent.
Constructing examples of values fulfilling all conditions except weak or coalitional
monotonicity is trivial – by lemmata 3 and 5 it suffices to define values by their RVZ





or pt < 0. Examples 2, 2’ and 3
present some such values which otherwise are of interest.
Example 2 The equal surplus value defined by Driessen and Funaki (1991)









is linear, symmetric, efficient and coalitionally monotonic, but—except for two-person
games, for which c is equal to the Shapley value—it is not weakly monotonic. To see
this, it suffices to compute its RVZ coefficients which are
p1 = 1 − 1
n
, p2 = . . . = pn−1 = 0 , pn = 1





. Alternatively, take zT ∈ Gn—the game
of incidence with coalition T ⊂ N ,
zT (S) =
{
1 when S ∩ T = ∅ ,
0 when S ∩ T = ∅ .
and check that the value of any player j ∈ T in this (monotone) game is c j (zT ) = 1−tn ,
so for 2 ≤ t < n it is negative. Thus, c is not weakly monotonic and hence not
procedural.
Example 2’ The least square prenucleolus introduced by Ruiz et al. (1996) as the
solution of a particular minimization problem and characterized by the formula













also satisfies all conditions in theorems 2 and 3 except weak monotonicity. A straight-
forward calculation of its RVZ coefficients demonstrates that pt = t (n − t)
n · 2n−2 and so—
except for two- and three-person games, where λ is equal to the Shapley value—some
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, which cannot be the case for a weakly monotonic value
(lemma 5).
Example 3 The value φ˜ assigning to each player the arithmetic mean of Shapley values
of all other players:




φ j (v) = v(N ) − φi (v)
n − 1
is obviously linear, symmetric, efficient and weakly monotonic, but neither coalition-
ally nor locally monotonic and hence not procedural.
In view of these examples, it would be interesting to find reasonable interpretation
of classes of values on Gn which contain P(Gn) but are assumed only to satisfy one
of the monotonicity postulates (weak or coalitional) instead of both. In case of weak
monotonicity theorem 4 in the next section provides an answer.
Example 4 The Banzhaf value β
βi (v) = 12n−1
∑
T⊂N
(v(T ∪ i) − v(T ))
satisfies all conditions in theorems 2 and 3 except efficiency.
Example 5 The value k dividing v(N ) among players proportionally to their numbers,
ki (v) = 2i
n(n + 1) · v(N )
satisfies all conditions in theorem 2 except equal treatment property, and all conditions
in theorem 3 except local monotonicity.
Example 6 The value ζ dividing v(N ) equally among all players with greatest “stand-
alone” worths when v(N ) is nonnegative and among all players with least “standalone”






y if i ∈ Y \ Z ,
v(N )−
z if i ∈ Z \ Y ,
0 if i ∈ Y ∪ Z
where Y = Argmax j∈N v( j) , Z = Argmin j∈N v( j) (in case Y ∩ Z = ∅, which is
equivalent to v(1) = v(2) = · · · = v(n), define ζ(v) = e(v)), satisfies all assumptions
of theorems 2 and 3 except linearity. Efficiency, equal treatment and weak monotonicity
of ζ are obvious, and it is clear that ζ is also locally monotonic. Moreover, the individual
value ζi (v) of (any) player i (i) by definition, does not depend on v(T ) for any T  i
such that {i} = T = N , and an elementary analysis of all possible cases of signs
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of v(N ) and orderings of standalone worths shows that for every player i, ζi (v) (ii)
is a non-decreasing function of v(i) and (iii) is a non-decreasing function of v(N ).
Therefore, ζ is also coalitionally monotonic.
4 Inverse procedures and other generalizations
This paper has dealt only with simplest kind of procedures under which the proportion
sk of own marginal contribution retained by the contributing player depends only on
his position in the ordering, k. The most obvious extension consists, of course, of
admitting more general classes of procedures.
It has been observed (remark 3) that allowing for negative coefficients sk, j leads to
all linear, efficient and symmetric values. This generalization, however, is of relatively
little interest, since such “generalized procedures” have no natural interpretation as
sharing rules. In this section I analyse in some detail the values resulting from changing
the set of beneficiaries of the redistribution of marginal contributions, and briefly signal
other possibilities.
4.1 Sharing with successors: self-dual values
One modest and simple variation on procedural values comprises sharing the marginal
contributions with successors instead of predecessors in the order of arrival. Let us call
sharing procedures of this kind inverse procedures, and the resulting values—inversely
procedural values. An inverse procedure on Gn is a family of nonnegative coefficients
((zk, j )nj=k)
n
k=1 such that ∀k ,
n∑
j=k
zk, j = 1 ;
zk, j is the share of player who comes as j-th ( j ≥ k) in the marginal contribution of
the player coming as k-th to the coalition Hπ,k . Since one can easily repeat the proof
of theorem 1 to show that an analogous theorem on equivalent representation holds





. Let us then take zk := zk,k and z = (zk)nk=1. The inversely procedural










(1 − zπ( j))m j,π (v)
n! . (6)
Proposition 3 (a) Every inversely procedural value zψ is linear, symmetric and effi-
cient, and its RVZ coefficients are
pn = 1, pt = zt(
n
t
) for t = 1, 2, . . . n − 1 ;
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(b) zψ(v) = ψ t (v∗), where tk = zn+1−k and v∗ is the dual game of v, i.e.
v∗(S) = v(N ) − v(N \ S) ∀S ;
(c) zψ(v) = ψ s(v), where s1 = 1 and sk = zk−1 for k = 2, 3, . . . , n.
Proof The proof of (a) repeats that of lemma 2: one has to count how many times and
with what coefficients worths of coalitions occur in (inversely procedural) values of
players. Part (b) is trivial, and (c) follows immediately from lemma 2 and (a). unionsq
It follows that sharing with successors does not extend the class of obtained values:
every inversely procedural value zψ coincides with a procedural value derived from
the procedure under which every player coming as j-th transfers to the predecessors
the same fraction of his marginal contribution to Hπ, j which he had to leave to his
successors when coming as ( j − 1)-th under the inverse procedure z.
One nice by-product of proposition 3 is a simple characterization of self-dual pro-
cedural values. A value ψ is self-dual if and only if, for every game v, ψ(v) = ψ(v∗).
Proposition 4 ψ s is a self-dual procedural value on Gn if and only if
sk = sn+2−k for every k = 2, 3 . . . n .
Proof By proposition 3 (b) and (c), self-duality of a procedural value ψ s on Gn [where
s = (1, s2, . . . sn)] is equivalent to
ψ s(v) = ψ s(v∗) = zψ(v) = ψ t (v)
for every v ∈ Gn, where
z = (z1, . . . , zn−1, 1) , t = (1, t2, . . . tn),
z1 = sn , z2 = sn−1, . . . , zn = s1 , t1 = 1 , t2 = z1, . . . , tn = zn−1
and so t2 = sn , . . . , tn = s2. Since ψ t = ψ s ⇒ t = s (proposition 1), this completes
the proof. unionsq
This implies that, in particular, all self-dual procedural values on G2 and G3 are
egalitarian Shapley values (on G2, moreover, all procedural values are self-dual).
For games with more than three players there are self-dual procedural values which
are not egalitarian Shapley—for instance, one such value is given by a procedure
s = (1, a, b, a) on G4, a, b ∈ [0, 1] , a = b.
4.2 Sharing with everybody. Extended procedures
One could also demand that both predecessors and successors of a contributing player
have positive shares in his marginal contribution. A simplest sharing system of this
kind was proposed as the “sock story” by Joosten4 in which a fixed proportion 1−β of
marginal contribution of each player in every ordering is put into a sock; afterwards,
4 Joosten (personal communication).
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this common pool is divided equally among all players. Clearly, the resulting value is
the egalitarian Shapley value (1 − β) · e + β · φ and as such it is also procedural with
s = (1, β, . . . , β) and inversely procedural.
When the proportion of marginal contribution put into the “sock” may depend on
the place of the contributing player in the ordering, we obtain sharing rules defined
by n-tuples of coefficients u = (u1, u2, . . . un), ∀i ui ∈ [0, 1]; each player π−1(k)
retains uk · mk,π (v) for himself and gives the rest to the common pool. The resulting
“common pool values” are given by the formula
ψ
(u)














and it is not difficult to check that they are again all procedural—the coefficients of
the procedure s equivalent5 to the common pool system u are
s1 = 1, sk = n − (k − 1)
n
uk−1 + k − 1
n
uk for k = 2, 3, . . . , n .
A more general way of sharing marginal contributions with all players is described
by an extended procedure—a family of nonnegative coefficients
(q, r, s) = (qk, rk, sk)nk=1
such that q1 = rn = 0 and, for each k , qk + rk + sk = 1 . The underlying sharing rule
prescribes dividing every marginal contribution of the player at k-th position in the
ordering (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) in the following proportions: qk jointly for all predecessors,
rk jointly for all successors and sk for the contributing player. Thus, analogously to



















rπ( j)m j,π (v)
n! .
Obviously, extended procedural values are linear, symmetric and weakly monotonic.
However, this generalization is real: not all extended procedural values are procedural.
This is best seen at the example of the extended procedure on G2 under which r1 =
q2 = 1, i.e., the entire marginal contribution of the first player in the ordering is given
to the second player and vice versa. Then, of course,
ψ
(q,r,s)
1 (v) = φ2(v) and ψ(q,r,s)2 (v) = φ1(v)
5 However, many different systems may lead to the same procedural value: e.g., the egalitarian Shapley
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– that is, this extended procedural value is obtained by swapping the individual Shap-
ley values between players, which clearly violates local and thus also coalitional
monotonicity. Thus, ψ = φ˜ on G2 (cf. example 3), and it is easily seen that also for
n > 2 the value φ˜ is extended procedural, with ri = n−in−1 , qi = i−1n−1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
However, it turns out that the class of all extended procedural values also has an
axiomatic characterization analogous to that in theorem 2 for procedural values and
using a natural monotonicity postulate. This is theorem 4 below, preceded by a lemma
on the RVZ coefficients of extended procedural values.
Lemma 7 For the value ψ(q,r,s) on Gn determined by an extended procedure
(q, r, s) = (q1, r1, s1, q2, r2, s2, . . . qn, rn, sn), the RVZ coefficients p1, . . . , pn are
pn = 1, pt = st + qt − qt+1(n
t
) = 1 − rt − qt+1(n
t
) for t < n.
The proof goes exactly the same way as that of lemma 2.
Theorem 4 A value on Gn is extended procedural if and only if it satisfies efficiency,
linearity, equal treatment property and weak monotonicity.
Proof The “only if” part is obvious. To prove “if” we shall construct, for any value ψ
satisfying all four conditions, a (not necessarily unique) extended procedure (q, r, s)
such that ψ = ψ(q,r,s). To this end, let us take the RVZ coefficients p1, p2, . . . pn−1






l0 = 0, lt+1 = (lt + pˆt+1)− for t = 0, 1, . . . n − 1 .
Further, define the family of coefficients (q, r, s) = (qt , rt , st )nt=1 as follows: q1 =
rn = 0 and
rt =
{
1 + lt−1 if lt < 0 ,
1 − pˆt if lt = 0 ,
qt+1 = −lt , st = 1 − qt − rt
for t = 1, 2, . . . n−1.Sinceψ is weakly monotonic, it follows from lemma 5 that−1 ≤
pˆt ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ lt ≤ 0 for each t. Therefore it is easy to check that all coefficients
qt , rt and st are non-negative, and this implies that (q, r, s) is indeed an extended
procedure. Moreover, for every t = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, we have pˆt = 1 − rt − qt+1,
which by lemma 7 means that ψ = ψ(q,r,s). unionsq
In particular, an extended procedural value ψ(q,r,s) on Gn is procedural if and only if
for each t < n, rt +qt+1 ≤ 1—i.e., if the extra condition of coalitional monotonicity
is fulfilled – and then the coefficients of its procedure are




A further departure from simple procedures considered in this paper involves making
the sharing proportions depend on worths of coalitions in the game whose value
is determined. This significantly broadens the class of values obtained; it will then
include, in particular, the equal surplus value, the Ju et al. (2004) “consensus value”
and various non-linear values.
Another direction of generalization is abandoning equal treatment by assigning
exogenous weights to players as in Kalai and Samet (1987). Such weights can then
give rise to potentially interesting classes of ”weighted procedural values”, determining
either the shares of individual players in portions of marginal contributions left for
contributors’ predecessors or the (unequal) probabilities of particular orderings of
players.
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